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Formal Specification and Run-time Monitoring 
within the Ballistic Missile Defense Project  
 
 
Dale S. Caffall1, Thomas Cook1,2, Doron Drusinsky2,3, James Bret Michael2,  




In spite of more than a quarter of a century of research in the field, there has been limited appli-
cation of formal methods to large-scale commercial and defense software projects. This report 
describes a formal methods-based specification and verification approach to the development of 
the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) battle-management (the Battle Manager, 
BM), an effort that is likely amongst the most comprehensive application of formal methods to a 
large-scale safety-critical software development effort ever reported5. 
Besides its scale, this effort is unique in the following aspects: 
• Formal specification assertions were developed during the requirements elicitation phase 
before the code development and testing phases. 
• Formal specification assertions, written in Metric Temporal Logic with Time-Series con-
straints (MTL/TLS) [CP, D1] were simulated under a variety of scenarios and real-time 
constraints using an assertion simulator [DS1]. Simulated scenarios were communicated to 
the customer (a domain expert) and to the modeling team, and were stored for later use (e.g., 
inside a test suite). 
• Formal specification assertions were associated with UML statechart models using a 
heterogeneous statechart and temporal logic specification environment [DS2].  
• Specification assertions span a wide variety of property categories such as interface safety 
and liveness assertions, capacity and throughput assertions, and statechart assertions. Run-
time Verification (RV) was chosen as the primary verification method [D2]. 
• Temporal assertions are used for run-time recovery from formal requirement violations 
[DW]. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes reported applications of formal methods 
to large commercial and government software projects. Section 3 describes software dependabil-
ity issues pertaining to the U.S. Department of Defense acquisition process for a complex sys-
tem-of-systems, such as the Ballistic Missile Defense Systems (BMDS). Section 4 describes the 
BMDS and Battle Manager (BM), and section 5 describes the BM assertion lifecycle, namely 
                                                          
1 Missile Defense Agency, 7100 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-7100, USA. 
2 Department of Computer Science, Naval Postgraduate School, 833 Dyer Rd., Monterey, CA 93943, USA. 
3 Time Rover, Inc. 11425 Charsan Ln, Cupertino, CA, 95014. 
4 The MITRE Corporation, 7515 Colshire Drive, McLean, VA 22102-7508. 
5 The description of the ABM provided in this paper does not necessarily reflect the architecture, technical opinions, 
or techniques used by of the U.S. government or any of the contractors working on the ABM project or any other 
project. Project details provided in this paper can be found in [Ca]. 
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from assertion specification, via simulation of assertions and ending in deployment and moni-
toring. Section 6 describes tools used for specification, simulation, and monitoring within the 
BMDS, and is followed by conclusions. 
2. Background: The Application of Formal Methods in Industry and Government 
The use of formal methods has been particularly successful in the computer hardware industry 
[KG]. For example, Chen et al. at Fujitsu used the SMV model checker to debug an error in a 
VLSI chip responsible for high-speed switching operations. The chip has 111K gates and SMV 
finds a counter-example identifying the error in 50 clock cycles, which is much less than what it 
would take to reproduce the abnormal behavior through simulation [CY1].  Computation Tree 
Logic (CTL) based model checkers have also been used by Raimi et al. at the IBM-Motorola 
Somerset Design Center to debug a design error discovered during hardware testing of the 
PowerPC 620 microprocessor [RL]. Asgaard et al. at Intel Corporation’s Strategic CAD Labs 
used a combination of symbolic trajectory evaluation model checking and lightweight theorem 
proving techniques to verify the correctness of an instruction-length marker (IM), a large, 
complex (12K gates and 1100 latches) circuit that detects and marks the boundaries between 
Intel architecture (IA-32) instructions, against an implementation-independent specification of 
IA-32 Instruction lengths [AJ]. They discovered a total of eight previously unknown IM errors, 
four of which were considered by the chip design team as defects that were difficult to find and 
diagnose with traditional validation techniques. Choi et al. at Samsung Electronics used the 
SMV model checker to verify the RTL implementation of the functional modules in an embed-
ded system-on-a-chip (SOC) composed of the ARM920T processor core and sixteen functional 
modules [CY2]. Besides finding many environment modeling errors and errors in describing the 
properties to be verified, they also discovered a few but crucial design errors. 
NASA was an early leader of using formal methods in the aerospace industry. There are many 
examples of using formal methods to design and verify mission-critical software in the 1990s 
[BC, CD]. In more recent years, the NASA Langley Formal Methods Team applied model 
checking to verify the presence of the safety properties in the requirements model using the 
NuSMV Model Checker [TM]. They found many errors in the original English statement of 
requirements and several errors in the model itself. Glück and Holzman at NASA Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory used a model extractor (called FEAVER) to create the top-level system models of 
two modules of the legacy flight software of NASA’s Deep Space One mission (one containing 
5166 lines of C code and the other containing 1894 lines of C code) to make direct calls to the 
source code, and applied the SPIN Model Checker to verify the correctness of the software [GH]. 
In addition to detecting a known error of the launch version of the software, the model checker 
also discovered a rare race condition that could cause the sequencing module to fail. In another 
experiment conducted by NASA and Time Rover, Inc., run-time verification was used to verify 
flight code for the Deep Impact mission [DW] and the Martian Rover software [BD]. 
Model checking has also been used by the Lucent Technologies to analyze their CDMA call-
processing library [CG]. The company created a testing infrastructure using VeriSoft to test the 
call-processing software by systematically exploring the state space of the model of the wireless 
network. The more than 1500 runs of the testing infrastructure uncovered several newly found 
defects in the call-processing software. 
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Despite these successes, formal methods have always been treated as a supplemental means for 
quality assurance and have not been an integral part of any large-scale safety-critical software 
development. 
3. Background: Unpredictability of Previous System-of-Systems Acquisition   
Acquisition of system-of-systems by the U.S. Government raises a multitude of issues that go 
beyond the acquisition of a single system, such as the system behavior of the system-of-systems 
as well as each system within the system-of-systems.  We define a system-of-systems as a fed-
eration of legacy systems and developing systems that provide an enhanced capability greater 
than that of any of the individual systems within the system-of-systems. The individual systems 
making up of a system-of-systems are often both developed for a different context and subjected 
to a different set of constraints than that of the system-of-systems.  For instance, the AEGIS 
weapon system was originally intended to provide area defense for naval battle groups.  When 
integrated into the BMDS, it is expected to interoperate with other systems within BMDS and in 
contexts of use that were not envisioned when AEGIS was developed in the 1970s. 
As examples to the potential impact of the U.S. Government’s current inability to confidently 
predict acquisition-based system behavior and continued failings in system-of-systems acquisi-
tions, the following examples are offered: 
US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces deployed six PATRIOT batteries in the Dhahran area 
of operations during the Persian Gulf War of 1991.  Of those six PATRIOT batteries, 
CENTCOM forces assigned Alpha Battery the mission of protecting the Dhahran air base.  Al-
pha Battery had been in continuous operations for over one hundred hours on February 25, 1991.  
Iraqi forces launched a Scud missile at the Dhahran air base that Alpha Battery failed to track 
and intercept.  The Scud missile impacted at an US Army barracks and killed twenty-eight US 
soldiers.  Subsequent investigations into this catastrophe revealed that PATRIOT could not per-
form sustained operations beyond twenty continuous hours as potential targets would fall outside 
the range gate – an electronic detection system within the PATRIOT radar that calculates the 
area in the field of regard where PATRIOT should next look for the threat missile.  At one hun-
dred hours of continuous operation, the shift in the range gate would be 687 meters so the 
PATRIOT could not detect, track, and destroy incoming ballistic missiles [Ga, Pa]. This example 
is an instance of insufficient requirements specification and verification.   
From a study of 387 software errors discovered during the integration and testing phase of the 
Voyager and Galileo spacecraft, Lutz [Lu] observed that the safety-related, functional faults 
Voyager could be categorized as follows: 50% as behavioral faults, 31% as conditional faults, 
and 19% as operating faults.  For Galileo, the safety-related, functional faults could be catego-
rized as follows:  38% as behavioral faults, 18% as conditional faults, and 44% as operating 
faults. The author concluded that the primary cause of safety-related, functional faults (62% on 
Voyager and 79% on Galileo) was due to requirements that had not been identified by the 
developers. This example is an instance of incomplete specification of desired system behavior 
and limited fault tolerance.   
These difficulties are by no means unique to the U.S. Government’s acquisition-based system. 
Wallace and Kuhn [WK] analyzed software faults from 342 medical systems and determined that 
43% of the software faults were logic-related errors such as incorrect logic in requirements speci-
fications, unexpected behavior of multiple conditions occurring simultaneously, and improper 
limits.  In addition, they attributed 24% of the software faults to calculation errors to include in-
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correct limits and ranges of computational variables as well as incorrect implementations of 
mathematical expressions [WK].  This example is an instance of logic errors.  Wallace and Kuhn 
further suggested that software engineers should consider formal methods for highly-complex 
systems with emphasis on pre- and post-conditions as well as the interaction of system functions.   
4. The Ballistic Missile Defense System and Battle Manager  
The Department of Defense (DoD) plans to develop a ballistic missile defense (also referred to 
as a “global shield”) to defend the forces and territories of the United States, its Allies, and 
friends against all classes of ballistic-missile threats.  The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will 
accomplish this mission by developing a layered defense that employs complementary sensors 
and weapons to engage threat targets in the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of flight, and 
incrementally deploying that capability.  The Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program is pur-
suing a broad range of activities in order to aggressively develop and evaluate technologies for 
the integration of land-, sea-, air-, and space-based platforms to counter ballistic missiles.  In 
parallel, sensor suites, battle management, and command and control will be developed to form 
the backbone of the BMDS.  
The BMDS battle-management (BM) software is a real-time set of system functionality that ad-
dresses warfighter usage. Key characteristics of the BM will include the following:  (1) a globally-
distributed network, (2) an operational battlespace that includes land, sea, air, and space, (3) capabil-
ity to address multiple targets that can threaten a specific theater of operations or region of the world, 
(4) management of concurrent battlespace activities, (5) some level of automated decision making 
regarding the release or hold of lethal weapons, and (6) stringent requirements for high levels of 
trustworthiness of the systems that provide BMD capabilities due to the fact that the threats to be en-
countered consist of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Item number six makes unpredictable 
system behavior untenable from the public-policy, functional, and safety perspectives. 
To achieve the level of desired predictable battle-management behavior, the BM contains a for-
mal representation that captures the desired BM system behavior and is used to test the formal 
representation against the expected battle-management properties. The BM will be deployed in a 

































Figure 1. The BM deployment within the BMDS 
 5
The battle managers must direct the activities in the battlespace.  Typically, multiple engage-
ments are occurring concurrently in the battlespace.  Oftentimes, the tasks for killing a threat 
object need to be executed at such a high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) that humans experience 
great difficulty in maintaining situational awareness of the entire battlespace. 
The battle manager acts as “glueware” between software applications unique to each battle-man-
agement domain, and the sensors, Command and Control (C2) systems, and weapon systems in 
that domain.  Battle managers must rapidly make decisions to counter both enemy actions and 
force movements.  Battle managers must correctly cope with the fog-of-war conditions that are 
ever-present during the prosecution of the war.  The success or failure of the battle-management 
functions will determine the success or failure of joint forces with respect to the achievement of 
their assigned objectives. 
Thus, the BM software is mandated to be trustworthy, real-time and distributed. The BM com-
puting will be accomplished through a network of computers that are connected to sensors and 
weapons as well as other battle-management computers.  The behavior of the battle-management 
software cannot be predicted with confidence given the actual configuration of weapons, sensors, 
and battle managers at the moment of battle.  Developers cannot test the battle-management 
software under realistic conditions prior to actual use of the software to determine the system be-
havior.  The duration of the defense engagement will be short:  it will not allow for either human 
intervention or debugging the software to overcome software faults at runtime.   
Fig. 2 illustrates a collaboration diagram for the Track Processing (TP) component. The Track 
Processor abides by the following domain rules: 
1. Track Processor polls the Track Data Store every five seconds, possibly resulting in a 
track object with information about an object in flight that is being tracked.  
2. Track Processor then discriminates this track, classifying it as either a threat track or a 
no-kill track.  
3. Track Processor then correlates threat tracks with previous instances of the same track, as 



























5. ABM Assertion Lifecycle: Formal Specification, Simulation, and Monitoring 
An ABM assertion lifecycle process was defined in which specifications were represented for-
mally, refined and validated through simulation exercises, and monitored via code execution un-
der a spectrum of test scenarios.   
Formal specification assertions were developed within the early stages of the software develop-
ment lifecycle.  An initial set of assertions was defined as part of the requirements-elicitation 
phase, independent of the software architecture.  Assertions were derived systematically from each 
of the rules of the domain, as each domain rule elicited relevant claims of safety and liveness.   
During the software design phase (UML modeling), additional formal specification assertions 
were defined and associated with the current software architecture.  Assertions were defined as 
relating to specific states, pertaining to an entire statechart (controller-level), or to a collaboration 
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resulted in an extended executable model.  The extended executable model was created through 
the use of automated code generation tools: they produced executable code for the control flow 
of the state-based model as well as the associated armor-plating assertion-checking code.  
The objectives of the extended executable model were as follows: 
1. To provide a behavioral prototype early in the design process. This prototype is used for 
demonstration purposes and for sanity checks. The prototype will be used in the future as 
a robust oracle for developers and testers. 
2. To resolve, early in the design process, possible contradictions between the UML model 
and the formal specification assertions. 
3. To provide a framework (timing model) in which to measure the system’s temporal 
behavior under various test scenarios. 
Assertions in the BM armor-plate extend executable UML-statechart models and collaboration 
diagrams in the following way: 
1. Formal specification assertions are capable of explicitly describing bad, or illegal, 
behavior. The statechart model on the other hand tends to capture good, or legal, 
behavior, with the expectation that bad behavior will be precluded by the good behavior 
according to the model, but without explicitly specifying such illegal behavior. For 
example, the TP component performs correlation after discrimination. Bad behavior to be 
explicitly stated is that no correlation of a track is ever performed before discrimination is 
performed for that track.  
2. Safety-related requirements require armor-plating to increase the trustworthiness of the 
software.  The battle manager must ensure that its safety-related functions are correctly 
executed in the BMDS.  In all likelihood, a ballistic-missile attack will involve multiple 
missiles; in other words the battle manager will be controlling the engagements of 
multiple, concurrent engagements.  The battle-management software must provide a 
degree of trustworthiness that is commensurate with the critical functions of battle 
management.  The consequences for failed software include, for example, massive 
civilian casualties or inadvertent release of weapons (e.g., interceptors targeted at benign 
objects such as commercial aircraft). 
3. The succinctness of some requirements lent themselves well to be expressed in formal 
specification assertions rather than in UML statecharts. For example, the assertion TP 
will never receive ten tracks within less than a minute is more naturally expressed 
through a formal specification language than visually through a state diagram.6 
Based on the BM prototype currently under development at the Naval Postgraduate School, it is 
estimated that the overall system will consist of up to two hundred assertions. 
Consider the following example of requirements for the track processor of Fig. 2 and its associ-
ated recovery.  The following assertions about the continuity of TP are monitored by a Safety 
Component (e.g., termed a “safety executive”) that monitors the processes in the battle manager: 
1. A track must be pulled from Track Data Store within fifteen seconds of its appearance 
in the Track Data Store.   
                                                          
6 In this particular example we used temporal logic with counting operators [D2]. 
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2. The first instance of a track file must appear in Battlespace Representation Data Store 
within thirty seconds of the first appearance of that valid track data in the Track Data 
Store.   
3. If (1) and (2) are not true at the same time, then Safety Component will send reset sig-
nal to Track Processing Component.  This means that the Track Processing failed to 
poll data (1) within fifteen seconds of a given set of track data appearing in the Track 
Data Store and Track Processing failed to discriminate and correlate the track data 
within thirty seconds of a given set of track data appearing in the Track Data Store.  If 
both assertion violations occur simultaneously, then the Safety Component will reset 
Track Processing Component. 
4. If (1) and (2) are not true at the same time following a Track Processing reset that oc-
curred within the past sixty seconds, then the Safety Component will deem the BM to 
be inoperable and direct the transfer of control to another battle manager.   
In our approach, BM assertions are classified as either statechart assertions, of correctness prop-
erties pertaining to states in a UML statechart, or collaboration assertions, which relate to re-
quirements pertaining to a collaboration diagram.  
Collaboration assertions pertaining to Fig. 1 fall into several possible categories, as follows: 
1. Input assumptions, such as the requirement: a single polling iteration delivers at most one 
track. 
2. Capacity, such as capacity requirement for the discriminator: a new discrimination re-
quest is never received while the previous one is still being processed by the same dis-
criminator object. Every block in the collaboration diagram has a potential capacity as-
sertion. 
3. Causality, such as: a track is classified as a threat only if Discriminate received an 
associated track two seconds beforehand. 
4. Liveness, such as: within two seconds of a track receipt the track must be identified as ei-
ther a threat or a no-kill threat, but not both. 
5. Consistency, such as: a track for an object that already induced a track in the past must 
always be recognized by the discriminator as an existing track. 
BM assertions are also classified into three kinds of assertions (test-time, simulation-time and 
run-time) according to their intended context of usage [DS1]. The most typical set of assertions 
consists of test-time assertions that are intended for testing the correctness of the design and/or 
implementation.  Simulation-time assertions use information about the environment not present 
in run-time.  These are used only for and during simulation. For example, the assertion no missile 
shall ever hit the Headquarters is only useful in a simulated environment. Similarly, the 
following assertion can only be checked in a simulation environment: if country C initiates a 
multi-threat missile launch, then BM should assign a weapon within x seconds. 
Run-time, or deployed assertions are assertions that can be used during run-time, in the deployed 
system. Run-time assertions are used to trigger run-time recovery from requirement violations 
described in the sequel. 
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The current formal specification language chosen for the BM is linear-time temporal logic with 
real-time constraint (MTL) and time-series constraints (TLS) described in [Pn, D1]. MTL/TLS 
was chosen primarily because BM related assertions contain real-time or time series constraints 
and the language has available commercial monitors and code generators. Future plans for BM-
related assertions include the use of non-deterministic statecharts as a specification language 
[D3].  
Specification assertions written in MTL/TLS were simulated under a wide variety of scenarios. 
Scenarios, which are timed sequences of conditions, vary in the sequencing order of conditions 
as well as in the absolute timing of conditions. The purpose of simulation is to assure no contra-
dictions exist between three views of a specification, namely (i) the conceptual cognitive re-
quirement in the developer’s mind, (ii) the natural language formulation of that requirement, and 
(iii) the formal language specification of the requirement. Hence, simulation is performed with 
the following goals: 
1. Full examination of each formal assertion under a plurality of scenarios. 
2. Comparison of the behavior of an assertion’s MTL/TLS formal specification against the 
behavior of the developer’s conceptual requirement. 
3. Examine the soundness and completeness of the original conceptual requirement, namely 
examine how the conceptual requirement behaves under a wide variety of scenarios. 
Run-time Execution Monitoring (REM) is a class of methods for tracking the temporal behavior 
of an underlying application. REM methods range from simple print-statement logging methods 
to run-time tracking of complex formal requirements (e.g., written in temporal logic) for verifica-
tion purposes. Recently, NASA used REM for the verification of flight code for the Deep Impact 
project [DW]. The majority of published REM methods use temporal logic as a specification 
language [D1, HR].  
REM was chosen as the primary verification method for the BM because of its ability to scale, in 
addition to its support for assertions that include real-time and time-series constraints. In addi-
tion, REM is planned to be used: (i) as a component within an execution-based model checker 
[DH] and (ii) in a closed loop, for run-time execution recovery, as described below. 
Run-time Execution Recovery (RER) from violations of formal requirements is a technique that 
integrates REM and the Monitored System (MS) in a closed loop so that the system, once noti-
fied of a formal specification violation, throws an exception and manages this exception in a pre-
determined manner. In [D4] Drusinsky describes a RER technique based on the heterogeneous 
coupling of REM and source code Java exception handling. This method uses a two-layered ap-
proach where the REM tool manages specification and monitoring while recovery is performed 
using Java exception handling.  
An alternative technique, currently under development for the BM, uses non-deterministic state-
chart specifications [D3]. This method is a single-layered approach where specification, moni-
toring, and recovery are all specified with one coherent language. 
An example of an assertion used for recovery is: a new discrimination request is never received 
while the previous one is still being processed by the same discriminator object. The recovery 
strategy consists of the prioritization of discrimination requests, handling of top-priority requests 
while storing lower priority requests in a temporary buffer to be processed if discrimination ob-
jects become available within a minute. 
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6. Tools and Environment 
UML statecharts are used to model dynamic artifacts of the BM system using the StateRover en-
vironment. The StateRover is a Harel Statechart editor, code generator, and visual debug anima-
tor integrated with the Temporal Rover run-time monitoring tool [D1, D2]. The StateRover gen-
erates a Java class per statechart under design. These control classes integrated with passive 
classes and stateless component code. Specification assertions are written in MTL and TLS, and 
are exercised using the DBRover simulator.  After simulation, an assertion A is associated with a 
state S in a corresponding statechart using one of two interpretations:  
1. The MTL assertion A must be true starting from the cycle in which S was reached, that is, 
the LTL equivalent of Always (in S → A), where a cycle is defined as every statechart 
state evaluation. 
2. The assertion MTL A must be true for all cycles statechart is in S, where a cycle is 
defined as every statechart state evaluation performed while inside state S. 
Future tools and techniques to be introduced are: 
1. A formal specification tool for non-deterministic statechart specifications [D3]. This tool 
enables visual, UML-like formal specifications that are as succinct as LTL. 
2. REM and RER using non-deterministic statechart specifications. 
3. Two methods for white-box Automatic Test Generation (ATG), which when combined 
with REM yield an executable model checker [DH]. The ATG methods are (i) model-
based (i.e., white-box test generation based on observations taken from the UML 
statechart model) and (ii) specification-based (i.e., white-box test generation based on 
observations taken from the formal specification, similar to the method used by the ATG-
Rover of [D2]). 
7. Conclusion 
In ballistic missile defense, the warfighter must have confidence that the battle manager will cor-
rectly complete critical battle-management functions in its operational environment regardless of 
the conditions in the operational environment; that is, the battle manager must be a trustworthy 
system and a dependable system [Mi].  We offer that the use of formal methods can increase the 
level of dependability and provide evidence to the warfighters to determine the level of trust-
worthiness of the system for operational use. Rather than discovering system behavior at the end 
of the development phase through intensive testing prior to fielding the completed product, we 
believe that developers should apply techniques that support the design and realization of desired 
system behavior from the earliest phases of concept development and requirements development. 
We propose the use of assertions in the development of formal specifications.  While formal 
specification assertions alone will not ensure dependable software, the use of assertions can in-
crease the confidence of the level of dependability and trustworthiness of a system.   The use of 
assertions can significantly reduce the errors introduced in the specifying system behavior.  As-
sertions can considerably increase the level of clarity in the assumptions and responsibilities of 
system behavior, and reveal errors such as logic omissions and conflicting logic-statements.  As-
sertions can catch common interface faults (e.g., processing out-of-range or illegal inputs) by 
precisely asserting the legal interface values for variables passed in through an interface. 
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Software developers should consider verifying the functional specifications with model check-
ing.  Model checking is not a proof of correctness; instead, model checking involves creating 
functional models of a system and analyzing the model against the formal representations of the 
desired behavior [LC].   For the battle manager, we propose to verify the functional 
specifications using an automated model-checking tool that can accept either developed 
specifications or UML statecharts as discussed in [GM], and exercise the temporal-logic 
assertions over a number of time cycles.  Such an approach can support the identification of 
inconsistencies and breaks in logic through the use of the model-checking tool.  From the results 
of the model checking, developers can correct our specifications and the artifacts from the 
domain analysis as required. 
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